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Abstract 
Inclusivity and the (Un)Civil Paradox: Critiquing and Needing Civility 
in the Public Sphere 
Justin Dean Hatch, M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2016 
Supervisor:  Patricia Roberts-Miller 
Scholars have turned toward Deliberative Democracy in recent decades in part 
because of its potential for including more voices in decision making processes that affect 
an increasingly diverse polity. Inherent in Deliberative Democracy’s models, though, are 
what can be understood as prescriptions of certain types of civility, as consensus is 
posited as only happening under particular circumstances. Valuing radical inclusion, this 
study investigates historical negative effects of civility policing before exploring a more 
agonistic approach’s potential for the inclusion of all voices, especially those previously 
marginalized.   
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1 
Introduction
Imagining a more inclusive public sphere, political theorists in recent decades 
have posited Deliberative Democracy as an alternative to interest-based or “aggregative” 
models. Interest-based models propose that a citizen’s primary responsibility is to vote 
into office those who represent her preferences or the preferences of her community. 
Kock and Villadsen compare this process to a marketplace, one in which “citizens are 
like consumers whose needs, interests, and preferences follow from socioeconomic 
parameters,” and where “elected representatives, in turn, are like channels relaying the 
preferences of their constituencies into legislation and governance rather than deliberators 
arguing about what is best for the polity” (3). They find that when the aggregated 
interests of individuals and not the common good of the greater citizenry are the goal, the 
role of rhetoric is reduced to bargaining between representatives. Important to the current 
discussion is that in this view, rhetoric and rhetorical participation are limited, 
constituting an exclusive public sphere, one in which meaningful and productive 
engagement amongst the entirety of a diverse electorate is discouraged (3).     
Finding the exclusive nature of the aggregative model problematic, proponents of 
Deliberative Democracy have imagined a vibrant public sphere—one in which all 
citizens are invited to participate. Deliberative Democracy, largely derived from the work 
of Habermas, Rawls, and their scholarly progeny, imagines citizens concerned not with 
securing individual preferences, but instead with deliberating about what is best for the 
greater polity. They acknowledge, however, that agreement about the exact nature of the 
greater good and how best to secure it is improbable in many circumstances, and so 
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Deliberative Democracy’s proponents often posit specific conditions under which 
meaningful deliberation will likely lead to consensus. Habermas, for example, posits 
ideal speech criteria in Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, a work that once 
translated to English in 1989 was a foremost influence on what has been called the 
“deliberative turn” in American political philosophy. Habermas writes that 18th Century 
salons and coffee houses signify an ideal public sphere and can be understood as holding 
potential for rational debate prior to a ruinous capitalistic imposition on such in the 19th. 
Century. First, for Habermas, these productive public spaces “preserved a kind of social 
intercourse that, far from presupposing the equality of status, disregarded status 
altogether,” thus allowing that “the better argument could assert itself” (25). Habermas 
also claims that in the ideal public sphere signified in the salons “economic dependencies 
also in principle had no influence,” and “laws of the market were suspended as were laws 
of the state.” This is an appeal to an absolute objective rationality that Habermas 
recognized was probably never realized; yet he persisted that “if not realized, it was at 
least consequential” (25). 
Also in these public spaces the then recent “commodification of culture” had 
created a public sphere in which areas of common concern previously considered off-
limits or the purview of institutions were open for debate, or for Habermas, “Discussion 
within such a public sphere presupposed the problematization of areas that until then had 
not been questioned,” as “The domain of ‘common concern’ which was the object of 
public critical attention remained the preserve in which church and state authorities had 
the monopoly of interpretations” (26). 
And finally, and importantly for the current discussion, the public sphere was 
inclusive. Habermas writes that “the same process that converted culture into a 
commodity (and in this fashion constitute it as a culture that could become an object of 
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discussion to begin with) established the public as in principle inclusive,” and that “the 
issues discussed became ‘general’ not merely in their significance, but also in their 
accessibility: everyone had to be able to participate” (26). 
Habermas, then, locating his criteria for optimal deliberative potential in an ideal 
of 18th Century salons and coffee houses, proposes open and rational debate among 
objective participants who are unencumbered by biases of station or institutions and who 
always treat each other as equals. Everyone is allowed to participate, all subjects are open 
for debate, and the best arguments win the day. In framing our current discussion, notice 
that Habermas proposes a type of civility, one which values reason, equality, and 
objectivity, and also note that his model is inclusive. Though Habermas will refine this 
speech criteria in a Theory of Communicative Action, writing explicitly about the “ideal 
speech situation,” and though he will later abandon the idea of criteria for that of 
“pragmatic presuppositions,” principles of civility and radical inclusion are mainstays not 
only for Habermas, but for proponents of Deliberative Democracy at large, including 
Habermas and his derivatives, as well as the other major figure equally credited for the 
genesis of the deliberative turn—John Rawls (Bohman). And while as opposed to ideal 
speech situations, Rawls uses the “original position” as litmus for rational debate, Adi 
Ophir, in his chapter “The Ideal Speech Situation: Neo-Kantian Ethics in Habermas and 
Apel” finds Habermas and Rawls engaged in the same project of delimiting criteria for 
optimal deliberation, writing, “Rawls ‘original position’ can be interpreted as a form of 
an ideal speech situation or be shown to imply one,” thus further supporting the claim 
that the Deliberative Democracy phenomenon and not just one strand of it can be 
understood as prescribing speech norms in ways that are to some degree exclusionary 
(213). 
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Certainly the renewed focus on deliberation in the public sphere has brought with 
it discussion about what exactly the proper conditions for deliberation are. What rules (if 
any) are necessary to create conditions where diverse individuals can persuade one 
another? Who gets to make or enforce those rules? How do such rules affect different 
groups? And most importantly for a democratic theory—a central virtue of which is 
inclusion—who (and what kind of speech) do such rules privilege, and who do they 
exclude? In short, Deliberative Democracy both attempts to tackle the problem of 
inclusion and has simultaneously brought in-tow a renewed interest in civility as most 
solutions to the problem of speech criteria prescribe civility or a derivative of such as a 
major function of desirable and productive deliberative and democratic speech situations.  
The current study is concerned with the ways issues of civility operate relative to 
civil rights activism, acknowledging that conversations on civility, both popular and 
scholarly, proliferate anytime civil rights activism peaks in the U.S. What is unique about 
the current moment is that the deliberative turn coincides with a forty year apex of such 
activism. The last time civil rights agitation produced analogous concern for civility was 
in the late 60s and early 70s as student protests on college campuses erupted over civil 
rights, campus issues, and especially U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. As students 
and young people of the era protested, marched, boycotted, and sat-in, their rhetorical 
strategies became increasingly radical. And as they made demands and sometimes 
threats, as they shouted when unheard, and as they sometimes attempted to halt the 
institutional machinery to which they were opposed, scholars in rhetoric attempted to 
grapple with their communicative means; in doing so they found themselves unwittingly 
engaged in prescribing civility in ways not wholly dissimilar to those of Habermas and 
scholars promoting Deliberative Democracy.  
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That is, while several scholars, including Wayne Booth (1967), A.M. Tibbetts 
(68), Franklyn S. Haiman (1968), James Andrews (1969), and Scott Brockreid and 
Donald K. Smith (1969), attempted to understand the rhetoric of activists in the 60s and 
70s, Edward J. Corbett’s famous “The Rhetoric of the Open Hand and The Rhetoric of 
the Closed Fist (1969),” is representative of such scholarship as far as they, like Corbett, 
attempt to understand and critique activist tactics of the time. Corbett famously theorized 
that late 60s radical rhetoric displayed four characteristics.  
First, he sees such as largely non-verbal and reliant on sensory experience, such 
as music and iconography, as opposed to words. Second, he writes that it is concerned 
with groups and participants as opposed to individual orators—Corbett calls this 
gregarious rhetoric. Third, he sees radical rhetoric as coercive as opposed to persuasive, 
and he describes coercive rhetoric as reliant on the “non-rational” and as working to limit 
options of audiences, writing, “I see choices as the key concept of rhetoric. Accordingly, 
where choices are arbitrarily pared down or eliminated, rhetoric begins to disappear. This 
may be the most ominous tendency of the new rhetoric” (293).  
While Corbett does concede that resorting to radical rhetoric often happens when 
marginalized people have exhausted, or don’t have access to, traditional channels of 
communication, he writes that this rhetoric of the closed fist, this coercive, limiting 
rhetoric, should be the privilege of those whose freedom or safety are endangered. He 
writes that a lot of activism on campuses doesn’t meet those criteria, and so is 
unjustifiably irrational. What is interesting here is that Corbett makes little distinction 
between the radical rhetoric of one group and that of another. That is, “arbitrary” protest 
rhetoric on campuses is distinct from that coming from recognized civil rights groups 
only in its legitimacy—meaning both are irrational; just one group is more deserving in 
their unreason. And Fourth, Corbett writes that radical campus rhetoric is “non-
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conciliatory,” meaning that rhetors make little attempt at ingratiating themselves to 
audiences, instead supposing that telling “it like it is” is enough (294). He sees this as an 
absence of Burkean Identification practiced by radical rhetors, in a rhetoric that is 
unlikely to persuade anyone that is not already on one’s side. Corbett concludes by 
lamenting a non-existent time when rhetorical interaction was generally logical and 
undergraduates spent their time constructing rational arguments:  
In the existential mood of the times, it may seem that reason has not governed, 
and cannot effectively govern, the affairs of men. But it would be a simple task to 
demonstrate just how quickly the everyday world would unravel if man, the 
rational animal, were to abandon logic. The open hand and the closed fist have the 
same basic skeletal structure. If rhetoric is, as Aristotle defined it, "a discovery of 
all the available means of persuasion," let us be prepared to open and close that 
hand as the occasion demands. Then maybe the hand-me-down from the dim past 
can lend a hand-up to us too. (296) 
Notice that for Corbett, and by associating the late 60s and early 70s rhetorical 
scholarship, the students do not accord with Habermas’s ideal, insofar as they are 
understood to be thinking as groups as opposed to objective individuals, and they are 
understood as either arational or irrational, not participating in objective consensus 
seeking, but instead are understood as misguided and coercive radicals. Importantly, 
because they do not fit a set of speech criteria that seem in many ways to align with 
Habermas’s, Corbett dismisses the claims of students, which certainly equates to 
exclusion. That is, the responses to student activism lead one to wonder whether 
Habermas’s ideal speech situation which prescribes both civility and radical inclusion, 
doesn’t in practice—by policing civility—accomplish the exclusion of the radical. More 
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broadly, it prompts one to ask to what degree prescriptions of civility and inclusion can 
co-exist. 
Still the receding of this wave of interest in the civility of radical rhetoric 
correlated with the dissipation of activism on campuses, and as we moved into the late 
70s relatively little scholarly interest was shown on the subject. While—to lesser 
degree—periodic swells of activism have bred sporadic interest in civility and radicalism 
in the past few decades, our current reality is the closest parallel we have to the activism 
of the 60s and 70s. In the current moment, the deliberative turn corresponds with a wave 
of radical activism and so, again, an interest in the civility of protestors. Yet this time, as 
opposed to scholarly interest in policing civility and critiquing activists (corresponding 
with the aims of Deliberative Democracy) scholars largely critique those participating in 
civility policing. As young people across the nation, many of them on college campuses, 
are responding to systemic racial injustice—police brutality, mass incarceration and 
unjust targeting and sentencing of people of color by police, economic and educational 
disparities, and discrimination on campuses—scholarly voices, in opposition to popular 
ones, are largely critiquing those policing civility. An incident on Yale’s campus 
illustrates both the reactionary impulse to criticize student activists and the scholarly turn 
toward critiquing that impulse. 
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Student Activism at Yale 
Legal scholar, David Cole, reports in the January 14, 2016 New York Review of 
Books that Yale is among a growing number of universities where students are—in ways 
that harken back to campus activism of the late 60s and early 70s—protesting the unequal 
treatment of students of color. Just before Halloween 2015, precisely thirteen Yale 
administrators sent emails to the student body advising not to wear culturally or racially 
insensitive costumes. Erika Christakis and her husband Professor Nicholas Christakis live 
onsite with and advise student residents at Yale’s Silliman College—these 
responsibilities according them the title “Master.” Each is to be addressed by students as 
“Master Christakis.” Erika responded to one email concerning culturally sensitive 
costumes which originated with the Intercultural Affairs Committee (IAC). The IAC 
email stated that though students had the right to express themselves, the university 
hoped students would avoid “those circumstances that threaten our sense of community 
or disrespects, alienates or ridicules segments of our population based on race, 
nationality, religious belief, or gender expression” (Cole’s paraphrase, 4). Christakis, in 
her response, wrote that faculty oversight of costumes signified in the IAC email might 
be “heavy-handed,” writing, “Is there no room anymore for a child or a young person to 
be a little bit obnoxious[…]a little bit inappropriate or provocative or yes, offensive?” 
(4).  
Christakis’ email was itself interpreted by Yale students of color as highly 
offensive when read in a Yale University context that minority students have long 
claimed was racially insensitive at best and at times outright discriminatory. Angered and 
hurt by Christakis’ email, students made several demands including the immediate 
removal of both Erika Christakis and her husband Professor Nicholas Christakis from 
their live-in positions at Silliman, positions which put them in close contact with students 
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of color. The situation culminated with a black student activist cursing in the face 
Professor Christakis as a bystander recorded it on a cellphone. The footage of this young 
person momentarily losing her cool was posted online and soon went viral, engendering a 
wave of backlash from popular outlets condemning the incivility not just of a single 
student but of student activists across the nation. Pieces in the Atlantic (Friedersdorf, 
2105) and in the Washington Post (Marcus, 2015) are representative of popular reaction.  
Three pieces of context clarify why students of color at Yale, including the young 
woman on the video, were angry. First, Cole writes: 
For some time Yale students of color have insisted that the university didn’t 
sufficiently welcome them. Only 3.5% of faculty are African American at a 
university with a student body that is 11% African American and 49% students of 
color. Students of color are more likely to be stopped by campus police, mistaken 
for service staff, stereotyped, and slighted by students and faculty alike. Racial 
bias, these students remind us, is not limited to inner cities. (4)  
Second, students were circulating at the time that a black female student had been 
turned away from a party on campus with the words, “white girls only.” While an internal 
review reported that black students were in attendance at that party and that the only 
evidence of the incident was second hand—the veracity of the rumor is irrelevant to 
reconstructing the context in which the young woman on the video exploded. It is enough 
to assume that she believed it to be true.  
And third, and extremely important is the fact that in preceding years, white Yale 
students had gone out on Halloween in blackface, a trope of minstrel shows in which 
white male actors would smear a charcoal mix onto their faces and perform highly 
offensive caricatures of African Americans.  So it isn’t the case that the student recorded 
blowing up at Nicholas Christakis was simply overreacting to an email; she was instead 
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enraged by the thought (mistaken or not) that the adult living in her residence hall, who is 
in many ways responsible for her well-being, would think an email that was trying to 
avoid having students dress in blackface was “heavy-handed.” Students should be 
allowed to be a “little” offensive after all, right? 
In the recorded conversation, Professor Christakis, “Master” Christakis, is 
surrounded by students of color who demand he apologize on the spot for his wife’s 
email. Master Christakis refuses, telling the students instead that if they are offended by a 
costume, then they should look away or confront the person wearing the costume. A 
reasonable thought? Certainly a young black woman should approach a group of drunken 
frat-boys in blackface and explain to them a racial history that extends from slavery to the 
present. The young woman lost her mind. The camera was rolling. And this is where our 
media decided to chime in, spending valuable resources condemning the incivility of a 
young woman instead of focusing on the far greater incivility of a context of racial 
insensitivity at one of our nation’s most prestigious universities.     
And David Cole astutely writes that instead of reporting on the greater injustices 
(an originary incivility) that created an unjust reality, pundits and previous commentators 
seem more interested in the perceived “incivility” of understandably frustrated protestors, 
thus availing themselves of hard racial truths and adding to the discrimination of those 
attempting to right racial wrongs. That is, participating in a pattern all too familiar in 
America’s relationship with civil rights activism, the nation, or at least our media, seems 
more concerned about perceived incivility of activists than with the greater incivility to 
which activists are responding. Such slight of hand has historically had the effect of 
diverting productive critical attention from actual racial injustice and redirecting it toward 
activist responses that are anomalous, taken out of context, or just less important to larger 
civil rights issues. That is, reactionary civility policing has the effect of protecting unjust 
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consensus, silencing dissent, and displacing blame, phenomena we will turn to at length 
later in the paper. 
Such civility policing is not surprising, for certain. Remember that scholars in 
rhetoric took the same posture in reaction to activism of the late 60s and early 70s, 
though Corbett and contemporaries were far more critical and qualified in their 
responses. Still, scholars of yesteryear and current popular critics similarly conclude that 
those deemed uncivil are irrational and uncritical. It follows in this line of thinking—
though the syllogism is often left incomplete—that irrational arguments or worse 
irrational interlocutors don’t warrant consideration, don’t warrant inclusion. With 
renewed activism, popular sources are assuming the old scholarly positions, and scholars 
in rhetoric are now critiquing those positions. As is the case with David Cole, a 
preponderance of recent scholarship on civility is critical of attempts at policing civility. 
The Yale incident is of interest to our current study for a couple of reasons. First, 
it demonstrates two sides of renewed interest in civility and civil rights. That is, the initial 
popular sources were attempting to enforce a type of civility, and David Cole critiques 
the ways that such civility enforcement works to perpetuate or multiply discrimination. 
This pattern continues as—with rare exception (some of which we will get to later)—
popular sources or those outside of rhetoric attempt to police civility, and scholarship 
inside of the field tends to be critical of such attempts. And the Yale incident 
demonstrates not just renewed interest in issues of civility, but more importantly, it 
exemplifies important disagreements about the term as well as the stakes involved in 
getting it wrong. What proponents of Deliberative Democracy fail to account for is that 
sometimes, having exhausted civil means, legitimate grievances are voiced in uncivil 
ways, and that Deliberative Democracy’s ideal speech situations and accompanying 
prescriptions of civility will exclude these voices and do so in the name of inclusivity.  
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That is, Deliberative Democracy’s public sphere as currently theorized would mute 
activist voices often coming from racialized and marginalized bodies. The following 
explores various scholarly critiques of civility that work together to elucidate how 
civilizing discourses have been used to exclude. After complicating Deliberative 
Democracy’s claim to inclusivity, this paper will explore a more agonistic model’s 
potential for inclusivity. 
Critiquing Civility Policing 
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While the current moment’s burst of student activism to some degree parallels the 
magnitude that of the late 60s and early 70s, scholarly responses have diverged from their 
predecessors by—instead of policing civility—attempting to outline the harm that such 
policing has had on marginalized people. For example, Patricia Roberts-Miller writes that 
“to prohibit anything other than ‘civil’ political discourse, as long as ‘civil’ is defined as 
discourse that does not upset anyone, is to prohibit social change” (Fanatical Schemes, 
231). Lozano-Reich and Cloud write that a “politics of civility […] has been proven to 
leave those already disempowered in a continued state of conformity, punishment, and/or 
silence” (224). And Raymie Mckerrow goes even further, writing of the “tyranny of 
civility” and concluding that “civility is servitude” (279). These scholars are far from 
alone in their respective perspectives, and the following will flesh out critiques made by 
several scholars before addressing an alternative to ideal speech criteria. 
Critics make three dominant charges against civility policing. First, that those 
enforcing civility value harmony over justice or equality. In various ways our authors 
argue that holding consensus, that which is inoffensive, or good feeling as one’s highest 
value can only preserve the status quo within communities, and so also within 
communities that oppress. The second—the idea that civility often functions to silence 
dissent—is often written as derivative of the first. That is, those attempting to preserve 
harmony within community often do so by silencing dissenting voices, which, by 
definition, serves to disrupt consensus or to subvert unjust harmony. Critics argue that 
under the guise of civility, those in power use charges of incivility to exclude arguments 
they disagree with (which is oppositional to the aims of Deliberative Democracy) or 
those emanating from racialized or gendered bodies they find inherently uncivil. Part and 
parcel of this second commonplace is the tendency of those in power—for the purposes 
of containment—to sit down in civil conversation with dissenters with no real intent to 
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listen or to act. An unwillingness to move, is indistinguishable in outcome from an 
unwillingness to listen; the outcomes of both parallel those of the non-encounter resultant 
from having materially silenced dissenting voices. And, finally, critics have demonstrated 
how civility has been used to displace blame—for injustice, suppression, or even 
violence—from oppressor to oppressed.  
Preserving Harmonies of Injustice 
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Scholarship critical of civility often presupposes both that discrimination persists 
and that progress in combatting such will only be achieved through activism. To this 
point, critics of civility generally position themselves as advocates for social change and 
often reference or echo the sentiment of Frederick Douglas’s famous lines taken from the 
“Emancipation of the West Indies” speech, lines that in 1857 constituted an ominous 
foreshadowing of the American Civil War: “If there is no struggle, there is no progress,” 
and “Power concedes nothing without demand. It never has, and it never will” (Fanatical 
Schemes, “Uncivil Tongue”). This progressive identity provides the basis for critique and 
will become important as our analysis later makes distinctions based on political 
orientation. While also aligning with historical activism of the past, proponents of civility 
tend to see the current harmony or consensus as worth preserving in its current state. 
They wish to preserve the present, or sometimes to return to a mythical civil past 
(paradoxically while aligning with agitation that served to disrupt the beclouding civility 
protecting the discriminatory consensus of that past). More on this later. 
Also, as we embark upon our dominant critiques of civility—valuing harmony 
over justice, silencing dissent, and displacing blame—it becomes useful to briefly outline 
the causal relationship between them that some of our critics either state explicitly or 
imply, a relationship that was only pointed to earlier. Patricia Roberts-Miller’s work 
demonstrates well the connection between the three. In her landmark study of political 
theory’s implications for writing studies, she writes:   
Prizing civility means that people who become confrontational or argumentative 
have violated a basic principle of social discourse, and they should be shunned and 
condemned. Evading conflict contributes to social harmony and can even facilitate an 
effective public sphere as long as the disagreements are relatively minor, but it cannot 
accommodate people who are deeply unhappy with the system itself. To the extent that 
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one can say there is a community, it is a community committed to injustice. (Deliberate 
Conflict 154) 
Notice that for Roberts-Miller protecting community at all costs leads to all three 
aforementioned problems. To the first critique, she writes that “evading conflict 
contributes to social harmony,” but if harmony or consensus is preserved within a 
discriminatory system, then the preserving act also protects discrimination along with the 
stasis of the community. And prizing civility and “evading conflict” for our author means 
that “confrontational or argumentative” voices are to be “shunned and condemned.” Such 
shunning constitutes an effective silencing of dissent—and condemnation implies desert, 
leaving both silencing and displacing blame in the service of maintaining unjust 
harmonies. That is, if one labels arguments that threaten the consensus of the community 
as uncivil and shuns or disregards them, that person is effectively silencing them, and if 
for the same reason one is condemning those arguments or those making them, then the 
possibility for suppression or retribution becomes real, and blame can be attributed to the 
“uncivil” party. And of course the net result—of such silencing of dissent and displacing 
of blame leading often to suppression, enacted within a community that discriminates—is 
the preservation of an unjust harmony. What is left is “a community committed to 
injustice.” Yet because some critics treat the three critiques as distinct or focus heavily on 
only one or two of them, the categorizations remain useful, and the following will give 
each individual treatment even while acknowledging their interconnectedness. The latter 
two will inevitably come up in discussion of the first, but then silencing dissent and 
displacing blame will be considered separately.  
Most important for our current purposes in outlining the first critique—preserving 
harmony at the expense of justice—is Roberts-Miller’s demonstration of the 
improbability of substantive change within a system that privileges harmony of 
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community above all else. Certainly communities are not worth preserving just because 
they are communities. Roberts-Miller points to Kenneth Burke’s (among others’) 
observation that communities sometimes form around objects of hate. Are we to assume 
that policing civility to preserve such communities is a worthwhile endeavor? How about 
communities built upon the subjugation or hatred of African-Americans? In Fanatical 
Schemes, Roberts-Miller addresses that question relative to communities built on the 
institution of slavery, and William Chafe addresses it concerning a Southern community 
constituted of Jim Crow customs.  
Chafe’s landmark work on the Black Freedom Struggle in Greensboro, NC, 
Civilities and Civil Rights elucidates the fact that while Greensboro framed itself as a 
bastion of racial progress in the South, it was in fact one of the last cities in North 
Carolina and even in the South to make meaningful, lasting change as it transitioned 
away from Jim Crow. While city officials were among the first to announce compliance 
with the ’54 Brown v. Board of Education decision, on the ground such pronouncements 
translated only to tokenism obscured by genteel Southern manners and promises never 
intended to be kept. Chafe names the veneer of progress and civility which serves to hide 
the glacial pace of racial progress in Greensboro “The Progressive Mystique,” and 
defines it as “a series of implicit assumptions, nuances, and modes of relating that have 
been all the more powerful precisely because they are so elusive” (6). The Progressive 
Mystique is a white paternalism that avoids conflict and portends openness to new ideas, 
with, of course, no obligation to act on those ideas. It values consensus, eschews conflict, 
and most important for the current discussion, it is civil (7). Chafe writes,  
Surrounding all of these motifs [those of the Progressive Mystique just outlined] 
has been a pervasive commitment to civility as the value that should govern all 
relationships between people. Civility is the cornerstone of the progressive 
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mystique, signifying courtesy, concern about an associate’s family children, and 
health, a personal grace that smooths contact with strangers and obscures conflict 
with foes. Civility was what white progressivism was all about—a way of dealing 
with people and problems that made good manners more important than 
substantial action. Significantly, civility encompassed all of the other themes of 
the progressive mystique—abhorrence of personal conflict, courtesy toward new 
ideas, and a generosity toward those less fortunate than oneself. (8) 
Notice that for Chafe, it is a civil, mannered Southern hospitality that preserves 
the harmony of Jim Crow communities in North Carolina. “Good manners” were 
privileged above “substantial action,” and so long as “abhorrence of personal conflict” is 
what constituted good manners, then the possibility for disrupting such harmony is 
averted. Unique to Chafe’s conception of civility and the Progressive Mystique, is that 
not only is it working to preserve a community harmony by disarming opposition, but it 
is simultaneously asserting how to categorize that preserved community harmony. That 
is, the Progressive Mystique not only preserves community, it also functions as an 
argument about what type of community it is preserving. To some extent all civility does 
this, as embedded in the move to preserve is the assumption that there is something worth 
preserving, but the Progressive Mystique is making a claim not just about preservation; it 
is arguing superiority. The Progressive Mystique attempts to argue that a community is 
progressive, but it does so by attempting preservation, an almost absurdist move 
considering preservation’s attachment to conservatism. Scholarship by Mouffe and 
McKerrow will frame such a move as illogical by asserting preservation as conservative 
and as always in tension with the move to transgress or progress within a liberal 
democratic society (see The Democratic Paradox and “Coloring Outside the Lines”).  
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The Progressive Mystique argues that when Greensboro shows, not just restraint, 
but “courtesy toward new ideas” and “a generosity toward those less fortunate” it is not 
just worth preserving, it is exemplary, and the argument remains convincing to some 
audiences so long as no one explores that community’s willingness to act on such ideas, 
or investigates what it is that leads some within that community to be more or “less 
fortunate.”  
Of course Chafe does investigate, finding that white Greensboro citizens and 
officials could maintain a system of Jim Crow—especially school segregation—and a 
reputation of racial progressivism by portending true concern, by expressing aesthetic 
kindness. While disempowered African-Americans expressed frustration or offered new 
ideas, white people in Greensboro maintained a listening posture but with no real 
intention to act, assuring that the civility characteristic of the Progressive Mystique 
preserved Jim Crow traditions in Greensboro—some well into the 1970s.  
Chafe also finds that the consensus that such a civility requires can be crushing, 
and here he continues, generalizing first that Southern black people were extremely civil 
and hospitable, describing them as generous and open, but then he writes,  
Yet blacks also understood the other side of civility—deferential poses they had 
to strike in order to keep jobs, the chilling power of consensus to crush efforts to 
raise issues of racial justice. As victims of civility blacks had long been forced to 
operate within an etiquette of race relationships that offered almost no room for 
collective self-assertion and independence. White people dictate the ground rules, 
and the benefits went only to those who played the game. (9) 
Chafe describes a Southern civility that required deference from black people. 
That is, if civility means being decorous, and local etiquette maintained a system of racial 
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inequality, then to be civil in this context, meant that both oppressor and oppressed were 
to play their respective parts.  
Chafe also brings up an issue that emerges in critical perspectives focusing on 
harmony in community, that of consensus. That is, to maintain a perfect harmony, 
substantial action cannot be taken without all within a decision making body being of one 
mind. To do otherwise would allow the possibility of discord. This problem of consensus 
is a major roadblock for African-Americans in Greensboro attempting to establish 
meaningful racial change.  
In fact, Chafe writes that it is an insistence upon consensus that stalled North 
Carolina’s move away from meaningful compliance with the ’54 Brown v. Board of 
Education decision. While quickly announcing compliance to the media, the North 
Carolina Board of Education’s actual plan, deemed the Pearsall Plan, effectively 
maintained that communities within the state were free to integrate if they chose to do so. 
The Pearsall Plan interpreted compliance as an absence of legal coercion in either 
direction. They were no longer legally requiring racial segregation in schools after all. 
Board members framed this plan as progress, but of course in North Carolina in the 
1950s—and even into 60s and early 70s—white communities that would take advantage 
of the new legislation and actively choose racial integration were non-existent. This 
means that the Pearsall Plan’s insistence upon community consensus effectively extended 
Jim Crow school segregation for twenty years (Chafe 96). Because of this charade and 
numerous other disappointments in North Carolina, Chafe will write that “a central 
vehicle for the effectiveness of this resistance was the Progressive Mystique, with its 
insistence on consensus, voluntarism, and the preservation of civility” (354). And he will 
ask, “Are civility and civil rights compatible? Will they ever be?” (355). His answer, of 
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course, is no, finding that “Civility within a context of oppression simply provides the 
veneer for more oppression” (Chafe 355). 
Chafe, in alignment with Roberts-Miller, will write that the other two dominant 
critiques of civility—silencing dissent and displacing blame—serve to maintain such 
unjust harmonies, and the ability of such to exclude are two-fold. First, hierarchal 
arrangements of “communities of injustice” protected by civilizing discourses are built 
upon foundations of exclusion. And the maintenance of harmony often requires quieting 
or dismissing arguments possessing the potential to disturb consensus. This study will 
now turn to an investigation of this latter form of exclusion, to the second dominant 
critique of civility—that it has been used to silence dissent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 22 
Silencing Dissent 
While the relationship between protecting unjust harmonies and silencing dissent 
has already been noted, several scholars do devote specific attention to the critique that 
those in power sometimes dismiss arguments they disagree with or those coming from 
bodies they find inherently disagreeable, all in the name of civility. That is, those in 
power may dismiss, punish, or silence those not adhering to arbitrary dominant modes of 
propriety. In feminist studies for example, Lozano-Reich and Cloud, respond to Bone et 
al.’s promotion of Invitational Rhetoric and civility with, “The Uncivil Tongue: 
Invitational Rhetoric and the Problem of Inequality,” a scathing critique that eschews a 
“politics of civility” as that which serves to silence dissenting voices, especially those of 
women. Bone et al. largely conflate Foss and Foss’s Invitational Rhetoric with civility, 
and Lozano-Reich and Cloud respond to “invitational civility” by stating that it is only 
preferable when interlocutors are on equal social, political, and economic footing—an 
extremely rare situation.  
Relative to oppressive forces silencing dissent with charges of incivility, Lozano-
Reich and Cloud write, “Bone et al. acknowledge that historically, societal standards of 
decorum have often been used to silence groups and keep them in their place. Nowhere is 
this truer than in the case of women, told to play nice with their oppressors (Ehrenreich & 
English, 2005 ref. in Lozano-Reich and Cloud, 223). While the authors reference several 
marginalized groups who have been silenced in the name of civility, their primary focus 
is on strategies used to quiet women. They begin by establishing a long history of 
punitive civility against such:  
Indeed, 19th-century notions of propriety and civility were used as cultural ideals 
to place legal, political, and physical restriction on women—whereby relegating 
women to the private sphere (Oravec, 2003). Antifeminists frequently appealed to 
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masculine norms of “civilization” to “depict women as less civilized than men, 
less able to contribute to the advancement of the race” (Bederman, 1995, p. 121) 
(qdt. in Lozano-Reich and Cloud, 224).  
While Bone et al. argued that invitational rhetoric (and so civility) was a way of 
effecting gender equality, Lozano-Reich and Cloud, in response, warn that promoting 
civilizing discourses has been used historically to discipline women, to silence women by 
effectively removing them from public life under the guise that they fall short of some 
masculine benchmark for civility. The argument here is that promoting civility among 
feminist activists may encourage those in power to resurrect time-tested silencing 
strategies.  
And Lozano-Reich and Cloud acknowledge that civilizing discourses have had 
especially pointed effect when combined with problematic discourses about race: 
“Extending this history, women of color have been silenced through civilizing strategies 
that deem legitimately angry speech to be ‘uppity’ or ‘illiterate’ (Anzaldua, 1999; hooks, 
1989)” (224). The authors conclude: “It has taken decades of critical feminist scholarship 
to resist politics of civility and overcome oppressive stereotypes so that women of color 
can be viewed as speaking subjects, and not as uncivilized subjects needing a firm hand” 
(224). The authors find disconcerting the possibility that women, and to an even greater 
extent women of color, could risk the hard won gains of feminist agitation by promoting 
what they see as discourses that have been used to silence and oppress. 
Lozano-Reich and Cloud also reference silencing strategies aimed not just at 
women, but at those challenging power more generally:  
When measured by standards of civility, protestors are framed as wild and riotous 
by dominant media, rendering their struggles illegitimate (Gitlin 2003). In a post-
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9/11 climate, moreover, uncivil protestors are equated with terrorists (and 
terrorists cannot be ascribed any rationality whatsoever.  
They then outline a broader discriminatory power of civility policing: 
Bederman (1995) asks whether conforming to mainstream standard of civility 
replaces one kind of exclusion with another. This paradox holds except in cases of 
discourses among equals. Discourses of civilization “have proven to be a slippery 
slope for those who dream of a more just society” (Bederman, 1995, p. 239). 
Likewise, Mayo (2002) argues that “civility is a form of social discrimination, for 
it is predicated on making distinctions that support accepted practices and values, 
and entails enacting those distinctions to the detriment of the purportedly uncivil 
(224). 
All this works in support of their assertion already given at the beginning of this study: 
“[a] politics of civility…has been proven to leave those already disempowered in a 
continued state of conformity, punishment, and/or silence” (my emphasis, 224). 
Roberts-Miller, too, in addition to outlining the dangers of valuing harmony 
above all else focuses explicitly on how civility can be used to silence. She writes in 
Fanatical Schemes that civility, tends to be defined through negation: it is not emotional 
or abusive; it does not involve personal attack; it is not offensive. Offending one’s 
audience, it is argued, alienates them, and persuading them necessitates moving them to 
one’s side, not pushing them away (4).  
Roberts-Miller goes on to write that “dissent is inherently disruptive and 
necessarily upsetting to anyone who identifies with the current system,” elucidating her 
point, which overlaps with Lozano-Reich and Cloud’s. That is, it is difficult to imagine in 
highly volatile political situations, a dissenting rhetoric that an opposing side wouldn’t 
claim was “offensive,” “emotional,” or “abusive.” In Lozano-Reich and Cloud we 
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witnessed patriarchal appeals to violations of standards of objectivity relative to women 
and other protestors as those groups were portrayed as “wild and riotous,” and their 
arguments dismissed as uncivil. Here, Roberts-Miller—in her exploration of anti-
abolitionist and pro-slavery rhetoric—finds that, though pro-slavery advocates refused 
abolitionists’ arguments on the grounds that they were “uncivil,” it wasn’t the way in 
which such arguments were being framed that was found to be offensive; it was that 
dissenting arguments were being made at all. 
To silence, of course, then  is to exclude, but the same vitriol, the same charges of 
incivility that form the foundations for silencing dissent, are often used to punish. Unjust 
punishment requires the displacing of blame, and as we will see as we turn to our third 
critique, distracts from the perpetuation of injustice. 
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Displacing Blame 
Critics of civility argue in various ways that marginalized dissenters—often 
labeled as uncivil disruptors of community harmony or as being too uncivil to be heard—
are often understood to warrant both oppression and suppression. And Raymie Mckerrow 
writes ironically, “If actors are passive and dependent, irrational and hysterical, excitable, 
passionate, unrealistic, or mad, they cannot be allowed the freedom that democracy 
allows.” He continues, “On the contrary, these persons deserve to be repressed, not only 
for the sake of civil society, but for their own sake as well” (280). As we have seen, those 
in power will often define civility in terms of reason and objectivity, but then define all 
dissent as unreasoned and emotive, allowing them to paint all dissenters as “irrational” or 
“mad” and in need of a firm hand. Sometimes, having been long denied justice and 
having exhausted civil means, marginalized voices are in fact frustrated, in fact angry. 
Through the lens of civility policing, marginalized people are not seen as victims of 
discrimination as much as uncivilized dissenters getting their comeuppance. They are not 
being discriminated against; they are getting what they deserve. In this view, when truly 
malicious groups attempt to disrupt peaceful protest with violence, the protestors will be 
arrested and their initial “incivility” in dissent—more than the opposing group’s 
violence—is found by those in power to be at fault. 
And often, audience members and media reporters will spend limited resources 
critiquing the “uncivil” rhetoric or behavior of protestors instead of giving credence to 
the far greater incivility in the form of discrimination or oppression that brought 
protestors to a location in the first place. They ignore the incivility of institutions that 
dismissed or silenced the countless civil attempts at dialogue leading up to protest. 
Instead they fall back on facile notions that no argument unless made decorously can be 
given credence. 
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This is the critique of civility that David Cole’s “What’s the Problem at Yale” 
illustrates. The young activists on Yale’s campus had legitimate grievances that had been 
left unaddressed when brought up through traditional channels. But when these students 
finally resorted to more radical means, they did finally get the attention they had been 
seeking. Garnered attention might have signaled hope for these students as they had been 
heard. Instead, reporters chose not to address the sad dearth of black faculty at Yale, not 
to report on a history of racially insensitive costumes among Yale students, or on unheard 
complaints of discrimination and insensitivity. They didn’t report on the insanity of 
expecting any African American to call any white person “master.” And they certainly 
didn’t report that the Christakises thought it was important to contradict an email from a 
cultural group on campus that simply asked students to be sensitive in selecting 
Halloween costumes. What was the thing most worthy of national news coverage? Well 
the tone of a very young black undergraduate’s discourse of course. Blame is displaced 
from those who are participatory in the creation of a racially insensitive or even 
discriminatory context to those who are being discriminated against.  
The collective effect of the scholarship critiquing past uses of civility is to 
complicate Deliberative Democracy’s foundational criteria, criteria aimed at creating an 
inclusive and productive public sphere. The critical scholarship corroborates and 
explicates the tension between civility and inclusion inherent in Deliberative Democracy 
that was pointed to in the opening exploration of Deliberative Democracy’s origins and 
scholarly responses to late 60s and early 70s activism. The collective effect of the critical 
lenses applied by David Cole and our other critics of civility policing is to complicate 
Deliberative Democracy’s claim that its ideal speech situations which are reliant upon 
civility can accomplish radical inclusion. Enforcing types of civility functions to exclude 
those arguing for change, those who can be dismissed, muted, or punished as uncivil. 
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Responding with Agonism 
Acknowledging that enforcing civilities which are foundational to Deliberative 
Democracy’s prescribed ideal speech situations is not the panacea for an inclusive public 
sphere, one might ponder the feasibility of discourses that make no such prescriptions. 
Chantal Mouffe, for example, responds to the deliberative turn with “agonistic 
pluralism,” a model that sees inherent antagonism—what she terms “the political”—as 
the conditions of existence for politics in general (101). Mouffe finds any single 
rationality to be the effect of institutional power and not of universal reason that could be 
appealed to in deliberations and that could lead disagreeing interlocutors to lasting 
consensus. Importantly for our current discussion, Mouffe finds Deliberative 
Democracy’s aspirations toward absolute inclusion hopeless so long as both inclusion 
and consensus are contingent upon alignment with a fictive universal reason (101). 
Agonistic pluralism, on the other hand, is all inclusive, prescribing no speech 
criteria and conceding the impossibility of shared reason—all are included. Opposing 
parties need not seek consensus, nor agreement of any type, but instead they recognize 
each others’ right to make arguments in the public domain. Mouffe writes, “This is the 
real meaning of liberal-democratic tolerance which does not entail condoning ideas that 
we oppose or being indifferent to standpoints that we disagree with, but reading those 
who defend them as legitimate opponents” (102). While brilliantly outlining problems 
inherent in Deliberative Democracy, agonistic pluralism fails to provide an impetus for 
continued political interaction once persuasion is theorized as unlikely. She briefly writes 
that sometimes people will agree, but that this process is akin to conversion as opposed to 
persuasion; she elaborates no further. While certainly not intended, her outlining of 
agonistic pluralism might allow it to be read as an expressivist model, one of display, or 
an intervention in aggregative models, for what else is the purpose of political 
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communication if not persuasion at some level? Regardless, for our current purposes, 
both Mouffe’s finding productive a never-ending contest between the liberal and the 
democratic as well as agonistic pluralism’s claim to universal inclusion and charge to 
take all interlocutors seriously will be of use. The possibility of including all voices 
without the constraints of criteria inherent in Deliberative Democracy may prompt one to 
ask what are the ramifications of including all arguments and all interlocutors regardless 
of how illogical, disruptive, or threatening they may seem. Is such desirable; or more to 
the point, is it even possible?  
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Returning to Yale 
To answer the question of universal inclusion, let us return to David Cole’s 
analysis of the student activist’s response to Erika Christakis email, and let us this time 
ask what agonistic pluralism has to add. Cole, at first glance, seems to be more closely 
aligned with Mouffe’s move toward universal inclusion than with more traditional ideal 
speech criteria. He is after all writing in response to popular media pundits’ attempts at 
censuring the Yale student and student activists more generally. Cole, by positioning 
himself as a proponent of free speech, argues that activists at Yale and on campuses 
around the country should be celebrated for their attempts to draw attention to systemic 
racial injustices. He chastised pundits who almost entirely overlooked racial injustice that 
they might critique a young woman losing her composure at Yale. Yet David Cole makes 
another observation that he doesn’t quite seem to grasp the significance of. That is, after 
recognizing and condemning other media pundits’ civility policing, he too faults the 
young woman for reasons both similar and dissimilar to theirs. He offers negative 
judgment upon the young woman’s momentary outburst before finding that the students’ 
demands function to limit speech.    
For Cole, demanding that the Christakises be removed from their residential 
positions after having sent the email amounts demanding punishment for speech and so 
limiting speech. While Cole does state explicitly that his criteria for acceptable 
communication is whether or not it limits free speech, he makes no admission that 
determining what limits speech and what does not is a complex task. He writes the 
Christakises as champions of free speech, sympathizing with the argument that Erika 
Christakis was simply asking for tolerance of all speech types in her email. Adopting 
Mouffe’s more agonistic lens requires that we treat Cole’s conclusion, at the very least, as 
contested.  
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While appeals to ideal speech might immediately locate the young activist’s 
speech as out of bounds, agonistic pluralism requires that the young woman be 
recognized as—in Mouffe’s parlance—an “adversary,” and so worthy of defending her 
argument. In ascribing to agonistic pluralism, without immediately demonizing her as 
uncivil, trivializing her as simply a young student, or dismissing her as a desecrator of the 
First Amendment, one might first, with no imperative to agree, recognize the argument 
she is making within the context in which it is being made. 
Remember that black faculty are grossly underrepresented on Yale’s campus, that 
students of color report being disproportionately stopped by campus police, mistaken for 
staff, and stereotyped generally. Remember that students were claiming that a black 
woman was turned away from a Yale party with the words, “White girls only,” and years 
earlier Yale students had, in fact, gone out in blackface. Just before the young woman at 
Yale lost her mind, and just after she demanded an apology, Professor Christakis instead 
of apologizing suggested that if she was offended by another student’s costume that she 
approach that student and voice her concern. That is, an older white male and professor at 
an elite institution’s suggestion to a young black female should she encounter a group of 
drunken white frat boys in blackface was that she approach them and explicate a history 
of racial discrimination that extends from slavery to the present. Add that—though Cole 
mentions in passing the recent attention given racial injustices in the United States—he 
largely sees them as disconnected from the ivy league campus, making little connection 
between an immediate Yale context of racial injustice and a national one.  
In 2013, President Barack Obama stated that if he had a son, he would look like 
Trayvon Martin, but there is no generational divide between these students and the black 
bodies being brutalized by police (“Remarks by the President”). For them it is not their 
progeny facing the possibility of bodily imperilment; it is them. David Cole, along with 
 33 
the Christakises so easily locates these young students in the space of the university—for 
the white couple, a place of privilege and safety. But blackness and the historical attitudes 
toward it are averted neither by ivy covered stone nor economic and educational 
privilege.  
As the names Trayvon Martin, Michael Brown, Eric Garner, Freddie Gray, 
Sandra Bland, and too many others circulate in national and social media, and as 
shocking numbers of people of color are brutalized by police, Erika Christakis’s email 
seems wholly unaware of the real, bodily connection that the angered students have with 
this context. The university is not a protection against a brutal American racial history; it 
is an emblem of it. The very wealth that established Yale university—now with a twenty-
five billion dollar endowment—was amassed in part, as was all Northern wealth, as a 
result of enslaving, killing, and raping black bodies (Cole 4). And arguing that these are 
simply facts of the past hardly confronts their continued effect on the present, signaled by 
the fact that just months prior to Erika Christakis’s plea for the allowance of racially 
offensive costumes on Yale’s campus, Dylann Roof, massacred nine black people 
gathered to study scripture at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in 
Charleston, South Carolina. One of the victims was state Senator Clementa C. Pinckney, 
demonstrating that places of privilege, like walls of ivy, may not protect all bodies 
equally (Alvarez and Blinder). 
Agonistic pluralism certainly requires that the Christakises and their arguments be 
taken seriously and understood in context. They, like the young woman, are not to be 
demonized, but instead understood as legitimate adversaries making arguments that 
require defense. This means that facile statements like Cole’s, which finding that the 
Christakises’ arguments simply encourage free speech, while the young activists’ limit 
such, are insufficient. Cole’s reading of both Erika’s email and Nicholas’s suggestion that 
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a young black woman confront those wearing racially insensitive costumes—within the 
larger national racial climate and the local campus context from which it is inseparable—
wholly ignores how their arguments leverage fear. The reality is that a young black 
woman is not going to approach, on the street, a group of drunken white frat boys in 
blackface to put forth nuanced racial and social arguments that they are unprepared to 
process. This means that arguing for the allowance of “offensive” costumes is not simply 
arguing for more speech; it is arguing for more of a certain type of speech and for less of 
another. The Christakises’ arguments work to encourage speech that (contrary to Cole’s 
reading) leverage power and fear in ways that limit speech, that limit counterargument 
and participate in local and national/local contexts that silence people of color. So while 
the Christakises certainly get to make their arguments, they also need to be held 
accountable to the truths of those arguments and asked to defend them. Certainly Erika 
can argue that offensive costumes should be allowed under the guise of free expression, 
but she then needs to defend why the right of expression of those wearing such costumes 
outweighs the right of expression that would be allowed in an educational context less 
tainted by racial fear. And more particularly she needs to acknowledge that racially 
insensitive costumes are themselves arguments, which make claims about particular 
cultures, about their pasts, and about their value in the present, and she needs to own up 
to the fact that she thinks more room needs to be made for these arguments and less for 
those they would suppress. 
In defense of the Christakises, David Cole quotes Snyder v. Phelps, the Supreme 
Court’s 2011 decision not to allow torts filed against members of the Westboro Baptist 
church for highly offensive speech offered in public spaces:  
Speech is powerful….It can inflict great pain. On the facts before us, we cannot 
react to that pain by punishing the speaker. As a nation we have chosen a different 
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course—to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not 
stifle public debate. (qtd. in Cole) 
Cole’s use of the Supreme Court ruling to justify the Christakises’ speech on campus as 
they performed in their capacities as residence hall “Masters” is fallacious if not 
disingenuous. The First Amendment forms a constitutional mandate that Erika Christakis 
not be sanctioned by the state for her choice of words; it was never intended to remove all 
social and economic consequences for speech. The First Amendment has nothing to say 
about a private institutions hiring and firing of what equate to maternal and paternal 
figures living amongst very young students. Cole’s erroneous appeal to authority, then, is 
a distraction from a productive agonism that results when all interlocutors are forced to 
engage and defend their arguments. This is the effect of power.  
While providing a productive lens for critique, what “pluralistic agonism” (and 
this analysis) doesn’t do is provide any finite resolution to questions regarding the 
interaction of civility and inclusion. As we have seen, civility policing leads to the 
exclusion of radical or dissenting voices, yet agonistic pluralism doesn’t solve the 
problem either. It only allows a complex identification of it. By insisting on civility, 
radical voices will be excluded, yet the Yale incident demonstrates that unqualified 
inclusion may prove impossible also as some voices and some discourses simply disallow 
others. This reality means that decisions will have to be made concerning which voices to 
privilege in particular contexts. Non-decision is impossible as inaction constitutes the 
decision to side with power, and it signals complicity with hegemonic silencing. While 
the current study has so far concerned itself with the inclusion of radical voices, further 
complications arise when focus is shifted to the unqualified inclusion of all arguments 
generally. This paper will briefly investigate both the possibility and desirability of 
including all arguments on all topics all of the time. 
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(Un)Settling Truths 
While civilizing discourses didn’t constitute a panacea for constructing an 
inclusive public sphere, reading the Yale incident through Mouffe’s lens demonstrated 
that “agonistic pluralism,” while possessing great interpretive potential doesn’t fill that 
role either. Yet, we explored only one complication that arises when applying Mouffe’s 
model (that allowing all voices becomes difficult when recognizing that some voices 
seem to disallow others), but this is not the only one.  
Mouffe argues that a benefit of the constant agonism between the liberal and the 
democratic is that it accomplishes the contingency of all claims. That is, the common 
sense position of today, always has the potential to be unsettled by deliberation of 
tomorrow. For this to be the case, though—for all findings to be contingent—all topics 
have to be up for debate, and while this might at first glance seem desirable, the 
continuation of debate on all topics is just not empirically possible when taking into 
account temporal realities, and the results of not settling particular truths can prove 
disastrous.  
For example, a major uproar from film makers and members of the scientific 
community resulted when founder of the Tribeca Film Festival, Robert De Niro, 
defended his choice to show a documentary about the debunked link between child 
vaccinations and autism, and he, like Cole and the Christakises, framed his choice in the 
rhetoric of free speech. He stated on March 25, 2016 that he would allow at Tribeca 
“Vaxxed: From Cover-Up to Catastrophe,” a documentary both directed and co-written 
by former Physician Andrew Wakefield, who authored the only study ever published 
connecting vaccinations and autism. That paper has of course been retracted, and 
Wakefield’s medical license revoked. Responding to critics of his decisions to show the 
film, Deniro wrote, “Grace and I have a child with autism, and we believe it is critical 
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that all of the issues surrounding the causes of autism be openly discussed and examined” 
(“Robert De Niro Defends”). Yet just twenty-four hours later, as pressure increased and 
the future credibility of the Tribeca Film Festival was called into question, De Niro 
changed his stance writing, “My intent in screening this film was to provide an 
opportunity for conversation around an issue that is deeply personal to me and my family. 
But after reviewing it over the past few days with the Tribeca Film Festival team and 
others from the scientific community, we do not believe it contributes to or furthers the 
discussion I had hoped for” (“Robert De Niro Pulls”). 
So while the continued agonism between the liberal and the democratic as 
imagined by Mouffe constitutes productive and interesting ways of talking about issues 
of speech in an inclusive public sphere, even this can’t account for the complexities of 
attempting universal inclusivity. As evidenced by De Niro’s initial comments, to allow all 
arguments around the issue of autism would be to give Wakefield his day, but to do so 
may have endangered the health of children. In enclaves where anti-vaccination 
advocates have found followings, deadly preventable diseases have begun to make a 
comeback, endangering the health not only of the children of those empathetic to the anti-
vaccination message but to the nation as a whole as the threat of reintroducing those 
diseases into the larger pool becomes real (“Spreading Along with Measles”). This does 
not mean conversation should cease on all topics that enjoy a scientific consensus, as the 
scientific community itself is built on the principle that scientific findings are contingent, 
representing the best information and technology available at a certain time. But in 
popular deliberation, continual contingency can have disastrous real world consequences, 
leaving us without easy answers to questions of inclusion. 
Mouffe deserves credit for introducing the Democratic Paradox into the 
conversation (for her the theoretical basis for universal contingency) as we certainly need 
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to continuously examine the findings of the past—findings that at one time proclaimed 
the biological superiority of a particular race or gender—but at the same time we need 
some debates to be settled—the debunking of the aforementioned claims, for example. 
Limited time and space for deliberation insist that we not spend all our time revisiting 
civil rights victories of the past or questioning all scientific consensus. So some debates 
have to be settled at some point, which constitutes an exclusion, even if at times a 
productive one. 
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(In)Conclusive concerning Inclusion and Civility 
This study finds Deliberative Democracy’s stated goal of including all voices and 
all arguments worth pursuing even if also finding its prescribed means of inclusion 
problematic and its goal of including all arguments impossible. The analysis, of course, 
recognizes that Deliberative Democracy’s proponents write of such goals as ideals 
unlikely to be reached, yet this only changes the question from “How do we achieve 
those goals?” to “Which theories get nearest?” Lozano-Reich and Cloud point to the 
central role that power takes when any norm of civility is enforced, but they overstate 
their case and fail to account for times when those in power do listen and are persuaded—
no matter how rare an occasion. And they fail to acknowledge that the advantage of 
power does not disappear when one adopts the “Uncivil Tongue.” In fact, if one adopts it 
both frequently and intensely enough, then the lesson of history is that the effect of power 
is not muted, but magnified. J. Edgar Hoover launched the Counterintelligence Program 
(COINTELPRO) against civil rights groups in the late 60s as activists in the black 
freedom struggle became more audacious, and though the maliciousness of 
COINTELPRO is outlined well in the scholarly literature, its effectiveness is often 
understated. Those associated with this program, lied, bad-jacketed, spread 
misinformation, and participated in what bordered on state-sanctioned assassinations 
while effectively undermining civil rights organizations, demonstrating that an uncivil 
tongue hardly guarantees a level playing field. Of course this analysis in no way 
condones Hoover’s murderous actions, and Douglas was correct about struggle and 
progress, but the balance between agitation, suppression, and progress is both more 
complex and more delicate than Lozano-Reich and Cloud acknowledge.   
This paper also finds value in Mouffe’s agonistic model so far as it requires—
without prescribing speech norms—that all arguments be taken seriously and their 
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interlocutors be required to defend them. This is an acknowledgement, like Lozano-Reich 
and Cloud’s, that power distorts deliberation, but this time by obfuscating some 
arguments behind a veneer of common sense or constitutional legitimacy as was the case 
with David Cole’s treatment of the Christakises. And while the principle of including and 
allowing defense of all arguments is valuable as an interpretive tool, it too is imperfect, as 
the impossibility and sometimes undesirability of radical, universal inclusion was 
demonstrated above. This study, then, far from offering solutions, instead points to the 
complexity of the problem and calls for increased attention to the interaction between 
civility and inclusion in attempting to realize the promise of Deliberative Democracy—
the promise that even the voices of the dispossessed will be heard in determining the 
trajectory of an increasingly diverse nation. 
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